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I. INTRODUCTION 
Child sex tourists: they could be pediatricians, retired army 
sergeants, dentists, or university professors.1  Society often visualizes 
sex-tourists as stereotypical pedophiles with a ten-page rap sheet of sex 
offenses.  Yet, sex tourists may not fit the stereotype society expects.  
“Tourists engaging in CST [Child Sex Tourism] often travel to 
developing countries looking for anonymity and the availability of 
children in prostitution.”2  Abusers who want to have sex with a child 
often pay other adults in order to receive these “services.”3 
Each year, the international commercial sex trade exploits 
approximately two million children.4  Generally, one victimized child 
may serve as few as two or as many as thirty “clients” a week, which 
amounts to 100 to 1,500 tourists each year.5  According to humanitarian 
experts, the United States, Mexico, and Canada alone account for 
																																																																																																																												
 1 The Facts About Child Sex Tourism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 29 2008), 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/08/112090.htm [hereinafter State Department Facts 
(2008)]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Stephanie Delaney, Young Person’s Guide to Combating Child-Sex Tourism, 
ECPAT INTERNATIONAL, 5 (October 2008), http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/sites
/default/files/documents/5209.pdf. 
 4 State Department Facts (2008), supra note 1. 
 5 Brittany Bacon, Stolen Innocence: Inside the Shady World of Child Sex Tourism, 
ABC NEWS (July 17, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3385318. 
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twenty-five percent of the global market for child sex tourism abusers.6  
The Internet allows sex tourists and tour operators to write detailed 
accounts of their experiences in the child sex trade, including how to 
access children and the current market price by area.7  On one website, 
for example, tour operators attempted to attract clientele by advertising 
“nights of sex ‘with two young Thai girls for the price of a tank of gas.’”8 
By sexually exploiting children, abusers inflict injury on children 
that impacts the child’s “physical, mental, and emotional health.” 9  
Traffickers10 generally prey upon vulnerable children—often runaways 
or victims of child abuse in their own homes—and exploit their 
weakness to gain control over them.11  If children escape the grips of 
their traffickers, they often face a lifetime of psychological trauma.  This 
psychological trauma impacts children’s “ability to reintegrate back into 
society,” and makes the healing process more difficult. 12   Various 
studies13 suggest that combating child sex tourism must start with the 
“Johns”—the men (and sometimes women) who feed into this industry 
and pay for sex with young children.14  Government leaders around the 
world now recognize that there is a market for child sex tourism and 
have come together to fight against the sexual exploitation of children.15 
																																																																																																																												
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Understanding Child Sex Tourism, THE CODE, http://www.thecode.org/csec/
background/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
 10 A “trafficker” is one who enslaves these children through force by either physical 
or emotional harm and generally makes money off of forcing them to engage in 
commercial sex acts or forced labor.  The Traffickers, POLARIS PROJECT, 
http://www.polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/overview/the-traffickers (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2013). 
 11 Tina Frundt, Enslaved in America: Sex Trafficking in the United States, WOMEN’S 
FUNDING NETWORK, http://www.womensfundingnetwork.org/resource/past-articles/ensla
ved-in-america-sex-trafficking-in-the-united-states (last visited May 29, 2012). 
 12 Understanding Child Sex Tourism, supra note 9; see Delaney, supra note 3, at 12–
13. 
 13 Jody Raphael & Brenda Myers-Powell, From Victims to Victimizers: Interviews 
with 25 Ex-Pimps in Chicago, SCHILLER DUCANTO & FLECK FAM. L. CTR. DEPAUL U. C. 
LAW 9 (Sept. 2010), http://newsroom.depaul.edu/PDF/FAMILY_LAW_CENTER_REPO
RT-final.pdf. 
 14 Id. (“Ultimately, eliminating demand for prostitution will be the only truly 
effective way to end pimping, which always involves the exploitation and abuse of needy 
girls and women.  Strategies to end demand are beginning to be employed by law 
enforcement officials through arrests of customers.”); see also Youngbee Dale, The Truth 
About Human Trafficking, Pimps, and Johns, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/rights-so-
divine/2012/jan/12/truth-about-human-trafficking-pimps-and-johns/. 
 15 See generally Delaney, supra note 3, at 14. 
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Countries are increasingly turning to creative means of prosecution 
to combat child sex tourism.16  “At least 38 countries have extraterritorial 
laws that allow the prosecution of their citizens” for child sex tourism 
crimes that are committed abroad.17  When a country criminalizes child 
sex tourism, however, offenders look for opportunities to commit this 
crime elsewhere, specifically seeking out countries where they perceive 
laws to be less effective in protecting children from sex crimes and 
exploitation.18  For example, in the United States, many laws criminalize 
sex with minors and other forms of child sexual abuse.  These strict laws 
may prompt offenders to pursue victims elsewhere, perhaps explaining 
the recent rise in U.S. citizen involvement in child sex tourism abroad.19  
For example, general visitor arrivals to Cambodia have tremendously 
increased.20   One reason for the increase in sex tourism in this area 
includes the fact that other prime destinations for sex-tourism, such as 
Thailand, are “said to be cracking down on sex tourism, compelling sex 
offenders to find a new destination,”21 and, in addition, the fact that 
Cambodia “appears to be well known for its lax law enforcement, 
pedophiles and opportunistic sex tourists alike have come.”22 
In countries such as Cambodia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and the 
Philippines, the laws concerning sex crimes and exploitation are less 
stringent than in other countries, providing offenders with a “loophole.”  
Because these countries have less aggressive or less effective laws 
against child sex trafficking, they provide a harbor for offenders to 
commit their crimes with greater anonymity and fewer consequences.23  
																																																																																																																												
 16 The Facts About Child Sex Tourism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 19, 2005), 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2005/51351.htm [hereinafter State Department 
Facts (2005)]. 
 17 State Department Facts (2008), supra note 1. 
 18 Delaney, supra note 3, at 8. 
 19 PROTECTION PROJECT, International Child Sex Tourism: Scope of the Problem and 
Comparative Case Studies, JOHN HOPKINS U. PAUL H. NITZE SCH. OF ADVANCED INT’L 
STUD. 29 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads
/2010/09/JHU_Report.pdf. 
 20 Id. at 106.  In 2000 Cambodia had 466,365 visitors, which rose to 786,524 in 2002 
and then in 2004 there was an even greater increase to 1,055,202.  Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id.  Similarly, Costa Rica in 2003 had 510,751 American visitors, while in 2004—
only one-year later—Costa Rica’s number of visitors increased to 633,640.  Costa Rica is 
an easy target country for sex tourists from America given that it is “easily reached from 
the United States . . . [t]ickets are inexpensive, many Costa Ricans speak English, and the 
dollar rules the day.”  Costa Rica now has a successful marketing image that welcomes 
individuals as a sex destination “where illicit sexual conduct involving minors was 
acceptable.”  Id. at 77–78. 
 23 Id. at 77–78, 106–07. 
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There are various other factors that may contribute to the high volume of 
sex tourism in countries like Cambodia, including: weak local laws 
against sex crimes and exploitation, the ease with which abusers may 
plan sex-tourism trips via the Internet, affordable transportation, and 
poverty24 in nations where the tourists visit.25 
Although the foreign countries where most child sex tourism occurs 
have criminalized child sexual offenses, sadly, victims are unlikely to 
report the crime, and governments rarely prosecute the few cases that are 
reported.26  This failure to prosecute may be due to police corruption, the 
weakness of government in poor and unstable countries, and the 
desperation of families struggling to survive in deeply impoverished 
nations.  Poor and unstable governments often do not have the resources 
to enforce laws protecting children and thus too often turn a blind eye to 
these crimes in light of the revenue sex-tourism creates for their 
economy. 27   Furthermore, many child sex tourists believe that their 
conduct is beyond the reach of the United States government.28  As a 
result, offenders try to cover up their actions by bribing “the police or 
other officials to avoid going to court,” and even the child’s family from 
telling officials.29 
To help combat the international problem of child sex tourism, in 
2003 the United States enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other 
Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act (the “PROTECT 
Act” or the “section 2423”).30  Congress intended to develop various 
tools, such as the PROTECT Act, to cover multiple forms of child sexual 
exploitation after it ratified the United Nations Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution, and Child Pornography (the “Optional Protocol”).31  The 
PROTECT Act defines the scope of various offenses that exploit children 
through transportation and travel.  Subsection (b) of the Act criminalizes 
foreign travel with the intent of traveling abroad to engage in sexual 
																																																																																																																												
 24 The poverty in developing countries is often characterized by lack of opportunities 
for real employment and “vast income gaps.”  PROTECTION PROJECT, supra note 19, at 21. 
 25 State Department Facts (2008), supra note 1. 
 26 Delaney, supra note 3, at 14–15. 
 27 Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 2 
(June 24, 2002). 
 28 See United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today (PROTECT) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2012). 
 31 Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
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activity with a minor.32  Subsection (c), in contrast, punishes all travel in 
foreign commerce that leads to subsequent “illicit sexual conduct” with a 
minor, even if the travel was not for that purpose.33  The PROTECT Act 
defines “illicit sexual conduct” in (f)(1) as a sexual act with a person 
under 18 years of age that would violate another law;34 or in (f)(2) as any 
commercial sex act with a minor, which would include any exchange of 
money for sexual conduct with a minor.35  The United States government 
can prosecute an offender through either definition, depending upon the 
facts of the case: both sexual abuse without an exchange of money and 
paid commercial sex acts fall within the statute’s ambit. 
Defendants have challenged the constitutionality of the PROTECT 
Act in numerous jurisdictions, claiming that Congress does not have 
constitutional authority to enact a statute that criminalizes an individual’s 
act outside United States borders. 36   Defendants have argued that 
Congress’s constitutional authority under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause37 would be limitless if the PROTECT Act could be used to punish 
American citizens for the simple act of traveling abroad, without prior 
intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct.38  The federal circuit courts that 
have analyzed the constitutionality of this aspect of the PROTECT Act 
have all agreed, however, that Congress had authority through the 
Foreign Commerce Clause to enact the statute.39  Although courts seem 
to be in agreement about the constitutionality of the statute, the way in 
which the federal circuit courts have come to that conclusion is uneven 
and complicated.  Courts disagree on the method of interpreting the 
Foreign Commerce Clause and how to apply it to section 2423(c)’s 
prohibition on foreign travel followed by sexual conduct with minors.40  
The circuit courts are unclear about Congress’s authority to enact the 
																																																																																																																												
 32 PROTECT Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2012). 
 33 Id. § 2423(c). 
 34 Id. § 2423(f)(1). 
 35 Id. § 2423(f)(2). 
 36 See United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (stating that Congress has the power “[t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes.” 
(emphasis added)).  Over time, the Supreme Court has distinguished there are in fact two 
commerce clauses: (1) the Interstate Commerce Clause and (2) the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.  See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). 
 38 See Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 309. 
 39 See generally Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299; United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60 
(2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bianchi, 386 Fed. App’x. 156 (3d Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200 
(5th Cir. 2003). 
 40 See discussion infra Section III. 
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PROTECT Act because the Supreme Court has not provided the circuit 
courts with meaningful guidance on the specific boundaries of the 
Foreign Commerce power.  As a result, some circuits have conflated the 
Foreign Commerce Clause and Interstate Commerce Clause analyses.41 
For instance, in United States v. Pendleton, the Third Circuit 
determined that section 2423(c)’s criminalization of “illicit sexual 
conduct” that takes the form of non-commercial sex acts with children 
abroad is constitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 42   The 
Ninth Circuit came to the same conclusion in United States v. Clark,43 
but the court employed a very different analysis than the Third Circuit.  
The Ninth Circuit’s Foreign Commerce Clause inquiry focused on 
“whether the statute bears a rational relationship to Congress’s authority 
under the Foreign Commerce Clause,”44 and considered extraterritorial 
principles.  In Pendleton, on the other hand, the Third Circuit applied a 
three-prong test that the Supreme Court developed in United States v. 
Lopez45 for evaluating the constitutionality of laws regulating interstate 
commerce under the Interstate Commerce Clause.46  The Third Circuit in 
Pendleton directly imported the Lopez framework to a Foreign 
Commerce Clause analysis without identifying the differences between 
interstate commerce and foreign commerce, and Congress’s different 
authority with respect to each. 47   Thus, the Third Circuit’s analysis 
created ambiguity for courts addressing Foreign Commerce Clause issues 
in the future.  This creates a danger that courts will apply diverging 
rationales in similar cases. 
This Comment will focus particularly on United States v. 
Pendleton, a case of first impression for the Third Circuit.  No other 
federal circuit has found the PROTECT Act’s criminalization of non-
commercial sex abuse of minors abroad to be constitutional, where the 
intent to engage in that conduct arises abroad.  Ultimately, this Comment 
argues that Congress has the constitutional authority to enact the 
PROTECT ACT, and that sections 2423(c) and (f)(1), which criminalize 
non-commercial sexual abuse of minors abroad even where the 
defendant does not travel abroad for that purpose,48 are constitutional.  In 
reaching this conclusion, I will address the debate among scholars 
																																																																																																																												
 41 Compare Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103, with Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 306. 
 42 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 311. 
 43 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 44 Id. at 1114–16. 
 45 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995); Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 306. 
 46 See discussion infra Section III. 
 47 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 306. 
 48 PROTECT Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(c), (f)(1) (2012). 
382 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:375 
	
regarding whether the courts have interpreted the Foreign Commerce 
Clause appropriately or if they have expanded Congress’s authority 
beyond what the Founders intended. 49   This Comment also aims to 
provide conceptual clarity on why the PROTECT ACT is a proper 
exercise of congressional Foreign Commerce Clause authority based 
upon an economic effects theory. 
Part II discusses the history behind the PROTECT Act and 
Congress’s motivation for enacting a novel statute that reaches abroad to 
target sex-tourism by U.S. actors.  Part III discusses the scope of the 
Foreign Commerce Clause, historically and as it is interpreted today, and 
Congress’s authority to enact the PROTECT Act.  Part IV argues that the 
PROTECT Act’s regulation of non-commercial sex crimes abroad is 
constitutional under an economic effects theory, using a Foreign 
Commerce Clause framework—one that closely mirrors the framework 
that the United States Supreme Court developed for dealing with 
commerce within the United States.  I analyze the authority under that 
standard to penalize those who travel abroad and sexually abuse minors, 
even where the offenders lack the original intent to commit the illicit 
act.50  Lastly, Part V argues that the Supreme Court must provide a clear 
standard for analyzing issues arising out of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause so the circuit courts can analyze other statutes consistently. 
II. THE PROTECT ACT’S HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Legislative History of the PROTECT Act 
The PROTECT Act criminalizes various methods of sexually 
exploiting children through the use of travel and transportation.  
Subsection (a) focuses on individuals who transport children “with 
intent to engage in criminal sexual activity.” 51   Subsection (b) 
criminalizes foreign travel for the purpose of having illicit sexual activity 
with a minor, but does not target the transport of children like subsection 
(a). 52   Subsection (c), the focus of this comment, criminalizes travel 
through foreign commerce followed by illicit sexual conduct with a 
																																																																																																																												
 49 See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 
956–57 (2010); see also Jessica E. Notebaert, The Search for a Constitutional 
Justification for the Noncommercial Prong of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), 103 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 949 (2013). 
 50 PROTECT Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2012). 
 51 Id. § 2423(a). 
 52 Id. § 2423(b). 
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minor while abroad.53  Subsection (c) is similar to (b), which criminalizes 
traveling abroad with intent.  Unlike (b), however, subsection (c) lacks 
any intent requirement, making it easier for the government to prosecute 
offenders.  Finally, subsection (f)(1) defines “illicit sexual conduct” as 
the non-commercial sexual abuse of a minor abroad,54 while subsection 
(f)(2) defines sexual conduct in a commercial sex context.55  Splitting 
illicit sexual conduct into two types aims to capture those individuals that 
are not necessarily exchanging money for sexual acts with someone, thus 
casting a wider net for a variety of child sex abuse offenses. 
Congress has amended the PROTECT Act numerous times.  The 
first version of the statute, the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act of 1977,56 emerged during a period in which juvenile 
prostitution was a growing concern within the United States. 57   The 
media extensively reported on the issue, and evidence suggests that 
increasing numbers of young students were dropping out of school and 
engaging in prostitution.58  Then-existing federal laws failed to protect 
children from being involved in prostitution. 59   The 1977 Act was 
enacted to directly address this issue but, unlike the current version of the 
PROTECT Act, targeted the transportation of minors abroad and across 
state lines only insofar as it related to engaging minors in commercial sex 
acts.60 
Congress reformulated and renamed the statute in 1994.  The 1994 
version, called the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994, criminalized travel in foreign commerce for the purpose of 
engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor.61  Almost a decade later, 
																																																																																																																												
 53 Id. § 2423(c). 
 54 Id. § 2423(f)(1) (referencing Chapter 109A, which criminalizes different forms of 
sexual abuse, not involving exchange of money); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (aggravated 
sexual abuse); 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (sexual abuse); 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (sexual abuse of a 
minor or ward). 
 55 Id. § 2423(f) (capturing “(1) a sexual act . . . with a person under 18 years of age 
that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any commercial sex 
act . . . with a person under 18 years of age”). 
 56 Act of Feb. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 1978 Stat, 1585 (amending 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423 (1986)). 
 57 D. Kelly Weisberg, Children of the Night: The Adequacy of Statutory Treatment of 
Prostitution, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 11 (1984). 
 58 Id. at 12 
 59 Id. n.72. 
 60 Act of Feb. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 1978 Stat, 1585 (amending 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423 (1986)). 
 61 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
108 Stat. 1796, Sec. 160001 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)). 
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in yet another revision of the statute, called the Sex Tourism Prohibition 
Improvement Act of 2002, Congress cited the Foreign Commerce Clause 
as the source of its authority to enact the law.62  In 2003, Congress 
revised the statute again because the previous version’s requirement that 
the State prove the existence of intent prior to travel made it almost 
impossible for prosecutors to secure convictions.  The 2003 revision was 
named the PROTECT Act, which altered the 1994 statute to include 
those individuals who traveled abroad in foreign commerce without any 
purpose to have sex with minors, but later ended up engaging in illicit 
sexual conduct.63  The PROTECT Act has undergone only a few minor 
revisions over the last ten years, and remains largely the same today as it 
was in 2003.  Today, the Act imposes penalties exposing defendants to 
sentences of up to thirty years in prison.64 
Records of congressional debates during each revision of the 
PROTECT Act provide important insight into Congress’s motivation for 
this legislation.  The congressional record shows Congress’s recognition 
of child sex tourism as a “major component” of the “worldwide sexual 
exploitation of children.”65  Noting the increasing frequency of child sex 
tourism, Congress sought to close “significant loopholes” in United 
States law that made it easy for persons traveling to foreign countries 
who engage in sexual conduct with minors to avoid prosecution.66 
Supporters of the legislation also stressed the need for aggressive 
changes in the law given that poor countries, “often under economic 
pressure to develop tourism . . . turn a blind eye toward this devastating 
problem because of the income it produces.”67  Other supporters noted 
that weak foreign laws as well as weak or nonexistent enforcement of 
foreign laws help fuel such exploitation by Americans abroad.68  Given 
these difficulties, sponsors of the legislation also noted that, some foreign 
governments want greater help from the United States in targeting this 
conduct. 69   The statute’s legislative history shows that some nations 
																																																																																																																												
 62 Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 5 
(June 24, 2002). 
 63 Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 2003 S 151(2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2012)). 
 64 PROTECT Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2012).  As of 2006, the United States convicted 
thirty-six child sex tourism offenders under the PROTECT Act.  See Bacon, supra note 5. 
 65 Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 2 
(June 24, 2002). 
 66 Id. at 3. 
 67 Id. at 2. 
 68 148 CONG. REC. 3884, 3886 (daily ed. June 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 69 Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 3 
(June 24, 2002). 
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recognize they cannot tackle a growing transnational problem by 
themselves. 70  Others seek U.S. help because they view the United States 
as culpable, noting “that many of the sex tourists are American.”71  In 
fact, a 2001 survey by World Vision and the Cambodian government 
“estimate[d] that twenty-five percent of sex tourists worldwide are U.S. 
citizens.”72 
When Congress debated which revisions to include in the 2003 
version of the PROTECT Act, a major concern among legislators was the 
fact that proving intent in cases of travel for sexual conduct with minors 
abroad is extremely difficult.  The issue of proving intent “creat[ed] a 
loophole in the law for men who go abroad to have sex with minors,” 
even though such conduct would be punishable as statutory rape at 
home.73  Other members of Congress argued that it should not matter 
whether intent was formed in the United States or abroad. 74   Thus, 
Congress ultimately enacted section 2423(c) to criminalize sexual 
misconduct that occurs abroad, irrespective of whether offenders formed 
the intent to engage in misconduct prior to traveling abroad, or whether 
the purpose of the travel was to engage in sexual misconduct in another 
country. 
B. The United Nations Optional Protocol 
Another reason Congress revised 18 U.S.C. § 2423 and enacted the 
2003 PROTECT Act was the Unites States’ 2002 ratification of an 
Optional Protocol to the United Nations multilateral treaty called the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution, and Child Pornography (the “Convention on the Rights of 
the Child”).75  The United States, under President Clinton, signed the 
Optional Protocol in July 2000, 76  and later ratified it with Senate 
approval and President Bush’s signature on December 2002.77  Shortly 
																																																																																																																												
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Cambodia: Survivor of Child Sex Tourism Implores Government Leaders to Take 
Action, WORLD VISION, http://www.worldvision.org/news.nsf/news/20070716_cambodia
_cstp!OpenDocument&wvsrc=enews&lpos=main&lid=cambodia_cstp200708&Click= 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
 73 148 CONG. REC. 3884, 3886 (daily ed. June 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 74 Id. at 3885 (statement of Rep. Flake). 
 75 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S 227 
[hereinafter Optional Protocol]. 
 76 Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, July 5, 2000, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 106-37. 
 77 Optional Protocol, supra note 75. 
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after ratification, the United States government amended 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423 to implement the provisions in the Optional Protocol. 78  
Currently, more than 100 countries have signed and ratified this 
protocol.79 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits the sexual 
exploitation of children80 and requires signatories to punish tourists who 
engage in commercial sex acts with individuals under the age of 
eighteen. 81   The Convention states that parties must protect children 
“from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse,” and take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that children are not abducted, sold or 
trafficked. 82   The Optional Protocol goes on to impose “detailed 
requirements to end the sexual exploitation and abuse of children” on 
State signatories.83  It mandates that signatories punish both individuals 
who transport minors for the purpose of sexually exploiting them, as well 
as offenders who actually engage in sexual conduct with children. 84  
Signatories of the Optional Protocol are required to implement it within 
their respective criminal laws, “whether such offences are committed 
domestically or transnationally.”85 
In addition, Article 4 of the Optional Protocol states that each 
signatory can take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offenses 
that the Convention outlaws if the offender is a citizen or habitual 
resident of their State.86  The Convention states that when offenders are 
extradited they are to be treated as if the crime was committed not only at 
the location it occurred, “but also in the territories of the States required 
to establish jurisdiction in accordance with [A]rticle 4.”87  This portion of 
the Optional Protocol extends each signatory’s jurisdiction beyond the 
geographical boundaries of their State in order to punish the offender.  
Therefore, the Optional Protocol allows the United States, as well as all 
																																																																																																																												
 78 Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C.§ 2423 (2012)). 
 79 Convention on the Rights of the Child: Optional Protocol on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and child pornography, UNICEF, http://www. unicef.org/crc/
index_30204.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) [hereinafter UNICEF Convention on the 
Rights of the Child]. 
 80 Optional Protocol, supra note 75, art. 1.  See generally Delaney, supra note 3, at 
14. 
 81 Optional Protocol, supra note 75, art. 4. 
 82 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 34–35, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 83 UNICEF Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 79. 
 84 Optional Protocol, supra note 75, art. 3. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. art. 4 § (2)(A). 
 87 Id. art. 5 § (4). 
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other signatories, to establish jurisdiction over an offender who violates 
the Protocol, as long as this offender is a citizen or permanent resident of 
the United States. 
C. The United States’ Interest in Punishing Its Citizens Under the 
PROTECT Act 
The sexual abuse of minors, even when it occurs abroad, affects the 
United States as a nation by imposing costs on the physical and mental 
health of its citizenry.88  United States children traveling with offenders 
who abuse them abroad will likely experience issues in the United States 
upon their return.89  For instance, the dangers of sexual exploitation of 
children include “long-lasting physical and psychological trauma, 
disease . . . drug addiction, unwanted pregnancy, malnutrition, social 
ostracism, and possibly death.”90  Offenders not only harm the children 
they have sex with while abroad during the physical, sexual act itself, but 
also subject children to a wide range of lasting psychological harms.  The 
United States has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from the 
destructive effects of child sex tourism. 
The United States also has an interest in preventing known 
pedophiles form recidivating, domestically or abroad.  Citizens who 
violate the PROTECT Act may also have a record for child related 
offenses in the United States.91  The United States strictly prohibits the 
sexual abuse of children;92  and because legal prohibitions thwart sex 
offenders from abusing children domestically they often turn to an 
international arena. 93   For instance, in United States v. Pendleton, 
Michigan first convicted the defendant, Thomas Pendleton, of sexually 
																																																																																																																												
 88 See generally Understanding Child Sex Tourism, supra note 9.  While the article 
does not expressly draw this conclusion, the fact that children often times develop health 
issues as a result of child exploitation, creates an inference that it will lead to economic 
costs for the U.S. if the “John” carries the health issue back with him or if the minor child 
was brought abroad, which lead to health issues, and then returns to the United States.  Id. 
 89 If a child develops a health issue, mental or physical, while abroad as a result of 
sexual abuse/sexual exploitation, then he or she will have to cope with it back in the 
United States.  Id. 
 90 State Department Facts (2008), supra note 1; see also Delaney, supra note 3, at 5. 
 91 PROTECTION PROJECT, supra note 19, at 40 (“[A]t least 13 perpetrators out of 50, or 
26 percent, had been previously charged or convicted of child molestation). 
 92 See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f)(1) (referencing Chapter 109A, which criminalizes 
different forms of sexual abuse, not involving exchange of money (commercial)); 18 
U.S.C. § 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse); 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (sexual abuse); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2243 (sexual abuse of a minor or ward). 
 93 See Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 
3 (June 24, 2002). 
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abusing children in 1981,94 and ordered him to serve twenty-four months 
of probation.95  Approximately twelve years later, in 1993, a New Jersey 
court found Pendleton guilty of engaging in sexual misconduct with a 
twelve-year-old boy.96  This time, Pendleton went to prison for seven 
years.97  In the 2000s—only three years after New Jersey released him 
from prison—Pendleton was caught committing child sex abuse for a 
third time. 98   The third time, however, Pendleton traveled to Latvia 
before sexually abusing two children.99  Pendleton was prosecuted in 
United States v. Pendleton a little over a year after his release from a 
Latvian prison.100 
Thus, the answer to stopping child exploitation cannot simply be 
stiffer laws regarding conduct within the United States, because child sex 
offenders may easily travel outside the United States to commit their 
offenses.  Given that the United States has an interest in protecting the 
rights and welfare of children and an interest in empowering its citizens 
to lead lawful, productive lives, it should, therefore, deter its citizens 
from sexually abusing U.S. children abroad by criminalizing this harmful 
conduct.  The PROTECT Act extends the United States’ jurisdiction to 
prevent these pedophiles from evading United States laws and to ensure 
that American citizens will be punished for committing sex crimes 
regardless of where in the world they occur. 
Along with all other countries, the United States has an interest in 
world health.  A devastating consequence of child sexual exploitation is 
the spread of HIV/AIDS.101  Offenders sometime fail to take measures to 
prevent the spread of disease because many believe that young victims 
are unlikely to have HIV/AIDS. 102   This belief, however, is often 
misguided.  “One study estimates that 50% of the child prostitutes of 
Thailand are HIV positive.”103  Hence, the potential spread of HIV/AIDS 
can occur through the exploitation of underage prostitutes as much as 
																																																																																																																												
 94 United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 302 n.3. 
 101 State Department Facts (2008), supra note 1; see also Delaney, supra note 3, at 5. 
 102 Case Study: Sex Tourism and Child Prostitution in the U.S. vs. Thailand, VIRTUAL 
COLLABORATION: LEARNING FROM MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES, http://www1.american.
edu/ted/thai-child.htm (last visited on Mar. 2, 2014) (referencing Asian Sex Tours Are An 
American Business, Too, Business Week (June 16, 1996), http://www.businessweek.com
/stories/1996-06-16/asian-sex-tours-are-an-american-business-too). 
 103 Id. 
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adults spread it.104  In sum, the PROTECT Act shields children not only 
from immediate and long-lasting emotional harm, but it also protects 
non-offending United States citizens from adverse health effects that can 
spread from the offender upon their return to the country. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE PROTECT ACT 
In challenging the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act, 
defendants often argue that Congress does not have authority under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause to regulate crimes abroad because if it did, 
then nothing would be outside the bounds of Congress’s power. 105  
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides 
Congress with power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with Indian tribes.”106  This text is the 
source of both the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Interstate 
Commerce Clause power.  In United States v. Lopez,107 the Supreme 
Court established a three-pronged test to evaluate whether Congress has 
the authority to enact a statute under the Interstate Commerce Clause.108 
To be a valid exercise of congressional power under the Lopez 
analysis, the statute must: (1) “regulate the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce”;109 (2) “regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even 
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities”;110 or (3) 
“regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce.”111 
Although the Supreme Court developed a framework for assessing 
the constitutionality of a statute under the Interstate Commerce Clause, it 
has not yet established a framework governing Congress’s use of its 
Foreign Commerce Clause power.112  In Japan Line, Ltd., v. County of 
Los Angeles,113 the Supreme Court stated that the Founders intended the 
Foreign Commerce Clause power to be more than that of the Interstate 
																																																																																																																												
 104 Id. 
 105 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 305; United States v. Bianchi, 386 Fed. App’x. 157 (3d Cir. 
2010); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 201 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 106 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 107 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 108 Id. at 558. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 558–59. 
 112 United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 113 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
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Commerce Clause. 114   Therefore, courts addressing the challenges 
associated with the Foreign Commerce Clause are attempting to 
determine whether the Lopez framework for interstate commerce applies 
to foreign commerce, or whether there must be a different standard to 
reflect the more expansive power.  Part III.A discusses briefly the 
constitutional history of the Interstate Commerce Clause and Part III.B 
explains the history and evolution of the Foreign Commerce Clause and 
how courts interpret it today.  Part III.C details federal circuit court 
decisions that have addressed the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause 
power.  Lastly, Part III.D assesses why courts cannot precisely apply the 
Interstate Commerce Clause framework to the Foreign Commerce Clause 
context. 
A. History of the Interstate Commerce Clause 
Throughout the Constitutional Convention, the Founders discussed 
the importance of creating a commerce clause. 115   Ultimately, the 
Founders granted Congress the power to regulate commerce within the 
Constitution in order to justify certain economic programs. 116   For 
example, the government’s urgent need for revenue to pay off 
Revolutionary War debts lead many of the Founders to push for the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.117 
The Founders also fervently debated how to define the term 
“commerce.”  During the Convention, James Madison understood the 
term “commerce” to mean trade and exchange, “distinct from the 
productive processes that made the things to be traded.” 118   In The 
Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton also distinguished between 
commerce, trade, and the production of the item to be traded. 119  
																																																																																																																												
 114 Id. at 448.  See generally Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 
434 (1932) (“[T]he power to regulate commerce is conferred by the same words of the 
commerce clause with respect to both foreign commerce and interstate commerce . . . the 
power when exercised in respect of foreign commerce may be broader than when 
exercised as to interstate commerce.”). 
 115 Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda’s Thumb: The Modest and Mercantilist Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 2–4 (2004); see 
also AKILL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107 (2005). 
 116 Johnson, supra note 115, at 4. 
 117 Johnson, supra note 115, at 2; see also, AMAR, supra note 115, at 107. 
 118 Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
101, 115 (2001) (referring to JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 487 (W.W. Norton 1987)). 
 119 Barnett, supra note 118, at 115 (referencing THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander 
Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 89 (Penguin 1961)) (“States 
Spring 2014] What Happens Abroad Does Not Stay Abroad 391 
	
Significantly, even “one hundred years after that superficially simple 
phrase [Regulation of Commerce] first appeared in the proposed national 
charter in 1787,”120 Congress did not substantially use its authority under 
the Interstate Commerce Clause.121  In 1824, the Supreme Court decided 
Gibbons v. Ogden,122 which was the first case to define the scope of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.  Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the 
clause broadly, as “reaching all commercial matters affecting the states 
generally.”123  This history of the Interstate Commerce Clause certainly 
suggests that the Founders granted Congress expansive power within the 
U.S. borders, but it does not explain how the Interstate Commerce Clause 
is similar to the Foreign Commerce Clause. 
B. Legislative History of the Foreign Commerce Clause 
Unlike the Interstate Commerce Clause, one of the main purposes 
of the Foreign Commerce Clause was to create congressional authority in 
any area that affects or impacts the general interests of the United 
States.124  For example, the Framers predicted that Congress would need 
to enact new legislation when “the States are separately incompetent, or 
[when] the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
Exercise of individual Legislation.”125  Hence, the Framers reasoned that 
if states enacted laws that concerned the whole of the nation, which 
would interfere with the country’s interests, Congress must exercise its 
foreign commerce power to unite the country with one law and one voice 
to keep the United States in good standing with foreign nations.126 
In 1787, the Founders’ view of the Foreign Commerce Clause was 
limited to that time and purpose.127  The Founders did not want foreign 
																																																																																																																												
themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective 
productions . . . .”). 
 120 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 
HARV. L. REV. 645, 645 (1946). 
 121 Id. 
 122 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 123 Stern, supra note 120, at 648 (“Gibbons v. Ogden was repeated, if not necessarily 
applied, in a number of leading cases between 1837 and 1913.”). 
 124 AMAR, supra note 115, at 107–08 (referencing Farrand’s Records, 2:131–32). 
 125 Id. at 108 n.*. 
 126 Id. at 107-108 n.*.  (The Founders recognized that a “single state acting on its 
own” was not best suited to handle issues arising with foreign governments because, if 
the state mishandled the problem, it “might lead to needless wars or otherwise 
compromise the interests of sister states.”). 
 127 The Founders’ interest in regulating commerce also reflected their desire to 
implement restrictive mercantilist programs against foreign nations.  Johnson, supra note 
115, at 6.  These programs consisted of retaliatory measures against the British, various 
navigation acts and port preferences.  Id.  In addition, the Founders wanted to retaliate 
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governments to disregard the United States, a new nation, as an 
unorganized and illegitimate. 128   Although the Founders created and 
initially used the Foreign Commerce Clause to develop programs 
addressing short-term concerns, the underlying purpose and spirit behind 
the Foreign Commerce Clause is relevant in determining the scope of 
Congress’s power in a modernized United States.129  Adjudicators must 
reimagine what commerce means for modern times.  The term 
“commerce” must carry a broader meaning than it initially carried.  As 
Akill Reed Amar noted, since 1787 commerce has retained “a broader 
meaning referring to all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life whether 
or not narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets.”130   The 
Supreme Court has also interpreted the Foreign Commerce Clause as 
applying to economic interactions.131 
Though hundreds of years have passed, Congress’s use of the 
Foreign Commerce Clause today continues to further the Founders’ 
intent: namely, to ensure that interactions and communications with 
foreign governments still serve the collective national interest.  In 
enacting the PROTECT Act, Congress recognized that United States 
citizens engaging in sex tourism adversely affects foreign nations and, 
therefore, undermines the legitimacy of the United States and its 
interests.132  Through the PROTECT Act, Congress recognized that the 
conduct of individual citizens could reflect poorly on the nation as a 
whole, thereby invoking one of the core policies underlying the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.133 
C. Federal Circuit Court Interpretation of the PROTECT Act 
The legitimacy of the United States government depends largely 
upon the judiciary’s reasoned analysis and consistent application of the 
law.  In order to maintain an unquestioned, legitimate system of 
government, therefore, the Foreign Commerce Clause needs one single 
																																																																																																																												
against the British by taxing their ships upon entry into American ports.  Id. at 18 
(referring to Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (Aug. 7, 1785), in 8 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 103, 329 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 
1973)) (observing that Congress had proposed to grant itself the power to regulate 
commerce so to obtain reciprocity from other nations). 
 128 See generally Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 445–47 (1827). 
 129 Johnson, supra note 115, at 56. 
 130 AMAR, supra note 115, at 107–08. 
 131 Id. at 107 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. 
Morrison, 549 U.S. 598 (2000)). 
 132 See Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 
3 (June 24, 2002). 
 133 See generally id. 
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and straightforward framework to provide Congress and the courts with 
clear guidance regarding the proper exercise of this power.  Recent 
circuit court cases have upheld the constitutionality of the PROTECT 
Act under a variety of rationales. 134   A uniform Foreign Commerce 
Clause analysis is vital in order for Congress to create laws that comply 
with the Constitution, and that will not be later overturned by the 
judiciary.  The federal courts must agree on the scope of congressional 
authority in order to prevent a disarray of approaches and ensure that 
court decisions are reliable and predictable.  A consistent and 
straightforward framework for evaluating a statute’s constitutionality 
under the Foreign Commerce Clause will create stability and ensure that 
the legitimacy of the judicial branch is protected. 
Several circuit courts, including the Second, Third, Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits, have found the PROTECT Act constitutional.135  These courts 
have taken three different approaches in their analyses.  Some courts 
analyzed whether there is a nexus between the United States and another 
country, some analyzed whether the Interstate Commerce Clause 
framework justifies Congress’s action in the Foreign Commerce Clause 
context, and some have focused upon whether the statute bears a rational 
relationship between the United States and another country.136  Yet, all of 
the circuit courts appear to agree that the Supreme Court’s framework for 
analyzing Interstate Commerce Clause issues does not specifically apply 
to the Foreign Commerce Clause, because the Foreign Commerce Clause 
authorizes different activities and policies than its Interstate 
counterpart.137 
1.  The Second and Fifth Circuits’ Interpretation of Section 2423(b) 
The Second Circuit has developed a “nexus requirement approach” 
for interpreting the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act.  In United 
States v. Weingarten, 138  the defendant argued that section 2423(b), 
criminalizing traveling aboard with the intent to engage in illicit sexual 
activity with a minor, was unconstitutional.  The Second Circuit first 
																																																																																																																												
 134 See generally Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299; United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60 
(2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bianchi, 386 Fed. App’x. 156 (3d Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200 
(5th Cir. 2003). 
 135 See Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299; Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60; Bianchi, 386 Fed. App’x. 
156; Clark, 435 F.3d 1100; Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200. 
 136 See infra Section III.C.1–3. 
 137 See, e.g. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 306; Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103, 1111 (citing Japan 
Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)); Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205. 
 138 632 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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grappled with the PROTECT Act’s extraterritorial application and noted 
a presumption against extraterritoriality.139  The court added, however, 
that a statute may be applied extraterritorially if there is evidence that 
Congress intended the statute to apply extraterritorially.140  The court 
reasoned that section 2423(b) “expressly proscribes . . . such crimes 
when hatched abroad,”141  and that denying extraterritorial application 
would undermine its effectiveness.142  Therefore, the court concluded 
that the PROTECT Act overcame the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.143 
Next, the Second Circuit reviewed whether the actions of the 
defendant, Weingarten, fell within the statute’s scope and concluded that 
they did not.144  Before committing the crime, Weingarten had traveled 
from Belgium to Israel, rather than from the United States to a foreign 
country.145  The court, therefore, found it unnecessary to address the 
constitutionality of the PROTECT Act under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, because the defendant’s travel did not have “a territorial nexus to 
the United States,” and thus was not within the meaning of section 
2434(b).146  The court held that for the PROTECT Act to apply to U.S. 
citizens’ sexual crimes abroad the individual must have traveled directly 
from the United States to the country in which the sexual misconduct 
occurred.147 
While the Second Circuit examined the PROTECT Act’s 
constitutionality under the “nexus approach,” the Fifth Circuit drew upon 
the Interstate Commerce Clause framework and applied it in the Foreign 
Commerce Clause context.  The defendant in United States v. 
Bredimus, 148  like Weingarten, 149  argued that section 2423(b) was 
unconstitutional.150  The Bredimus court relied upon a Second Circuit 
case, United States v. Han,151 which involved Congress’s authority under 
the Interstate Commerce Clause to criminalize the transportation of a 
minor for illicit sexual conduct within the boundaries of the United 
																																																																																																																												
 139 Id. at 64. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 66. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 67. 
 144 Weingarten, 632 F.3d at 71. 
 145 Id. at 61. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 71. 
 148 352 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 149 632 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 150 Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 204. 
 151 230 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2000). 
Spring 2014] What Happens Abroad Does Not Stay Abroad 395 
	
States.152  The Han court concluded that the statute was constitutional 
and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. 153   In Bredimus, the court 
justified its application of the Lopez interstate commerce framework to 
the Foreign Commerce Clause context because the latter clause gives 
Congress even greater authority.154  The Fifth Circuit did not explain, 
however, why the Interstate Commerce Clause—which contemplates 
activities within the U.S. over which the courts undoubtedly have 
jurisdiction—and the Foreign Commerce Clause—which contemplates 
conduct outside U.S. territory—should be analyzed in an identical 
manner. 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of Section 2423(c) in United 
States v. Clark 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit adopted a “global, common sense 
approach” in addressing whether Congress had the authority to enact 
section 2423(c) under the Foreign Commerce Clause.  United States v. 
Clark 155  was the first circuit court decision to address the 
constitutionality of section 2423(c) under the Foreign Commerce Clause.  
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Lopez’s framework for assessing 
Interstate Commerce Clause questions was not relevant to the Foreign 
Commerce Clause because the Founders intended the scope of the 
Foreign Commerce Clause to be greater. 156   Although the court 
considered “adapting the interstate commerce categories to foreign 
commerce in specific contexts,”157 it ultimately chose not to, reasoning 
that a “‘global, commonsense approach,’ which considers ‘whether the 
statute bears a rational relationship to Congress’s authority under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause,’” was better suited to the foreign setting.158 
In determining whether subsection (c) was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause power, the court first “look[ed] to 
the text of 2423(c) [and (f)(2)] to discern whether it has a constitutionally 
tenable nexus with foreign commerce.” 159  In evaluating that question, 
																																																																																																																												
 152 Id. at 562–63.  The defendant in Han was charged with traveling from New York 
to New Jersey in order to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a thirteen year old.  Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 208. 
 155 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 156 Id. at 1114. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 1118 (stating that taking an international flight traveling abroad cannot then 
mean that every other act is under the Foreign Commerce Clause). 
 159 Id. at 1114; see also Jeff Christensen, Congressional Power to Regulate 
Noncommercial Activity Overseas: Interstate Commerce Clause Precedent Indicates 
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the court asked “whether the statute bears a rational relationship to 
Congress’s authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause.” 160  
Subsection (c) requires travel in foreign commerce plus an “engagement 
in a commercial transaction abroad.” 161  Thus, the court concluded that 
subsection (c) is constitutional because it “implicates foreign commerce 
to a constitutionally adequate degree.”162 
In Clark, the defendant, living primarily in Cambodia, molested 
young boys. 163  The defendant’s sexual misconduct came to the attention 
of a non-governmental organization whose goal was to rescue boys who 
had already endured sexual abuse from non-Cambodians. 164   The 
defendant paid the young boys, in exchange for sexual acts, so they could 
buy food for their families.165  Here, the court recognized that there were 
two separate definitions of what constituted an illicit sexual act: a 
commercial act and a non-commercial act.166  The court noted that a non-
commercial sex act “combined the definition of sexual act and 
aggravated sexual abuse, which included sex by force, threat, or sexual 
abuse of a minor.”167  On the other hand, a commercial sex act revolved 
around a value exchanged for the act. 168   The court reasoned that 
Congress was acting within its authority under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause to regulate commercial sex acts because the Supreme Court has 
viewed the Interstate Commerce Clause to grasp all types of commercial 
intercourse. 169   The court, however, declined to decide the 
constitutionality of section 2423(c) with respect to non-commercial sex 
acts. 170  Thus, the court left the constitutionality of federal regulation of 
non-commercial sex acts unanswered. 
																																																																																																																												
Constitutional Limitations on Foreign Commerce Clause Authority, 81 WASH. L. REV. 
621, 635 (2006). 
 160 Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 1103. 
 164 Id. at 1103. 
 165 Id. at 1104. 
 166 Clark, 435 F.3d at 1105. 
 167 Julie Buffington, Taking the Ball and Running with it: U.S. v. Clark and 
Congress’s Unlimited Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
841, 852 (2006). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114–15 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 193 (1824)). 
 170 Id. at 1110 n.16 (noting that the court does not “decide the constitutionality of 
§ 2423(c) with respect to the illicit sexual conduct covered by the non-commercial prong 
of the statute, such as sex acts accomplished by use of force or threat”). 
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3. United States v. Pendleton: The Third Circuit Interpretation of 
Section 2423(c) and the Non-Commercial Prong 
Contrary to the Clark court’s “global, common sense approach,”171 
the Third Circuit in United States v. Pendleton172 used the three-pronged 
Interstate Commerce Clause framework to address the constitutionality 
of the PROTECT Act, specifically addressing the non-commercial prong 
within the Foreign Commerce context.  The court addressed whether the 
PROTECT Act’s criminalization of “noncommercial illicit sexual 
conduct outside the United States” was a valid exercise of Congress’s 
power under the Foreign Commerce Clause, an issue of first impression 
within that circuit.173  Pendleton, however, was not the first case in which 
the Third Circuit decided issues regarding section 2423(c).  In United 
States v. Bianchi,174 the Third Circuit addressed the constitutionality of 
section 2423(f)(2), which pertains to commercial sex acts.175  In contrast, 
the defendant in Pendleton engaged in illicit sexual conduct that was 
non-commercial, triggering the application of both sections 2423(c) and 
(f)(1).176 
In Pendleton, the defendant flew from New York to Germany.177  
After six months in Germany, Pendleton sexually molested a fifteen-
year-old boy.178  German authorities arrested Pendleton and placed him 
on trial.179  The German court found him guilty and sentenced him to 
nineteen months in German prison.180  Upon his return to the United 
States, federal authorities took Pendleton into custody and charged him 
under the non-commercial sexual conduct provision of the PROTECT 
Act, section 2423(f)(1).181  After he was convicted, the court sentenced 
Pendleton to thirty years in prison, which he appealed.182 
In addressing the constitutionality of PROTECT Act’s 
criminalization of non-commercial sex acts arising abroad, the court first 
																																																																																																																												
 171 Id. at 1103. 
 172 658 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 173 Id. at 301. 
 174 386 Fed. App’x. 156 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 175 Id. at 157 (noting that defendant exchanged money to the victim child and family 
for the sexual acts he committed on the boy). 
 176 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 301. 
 177 Id. at 303. 
 178 Id. at 301. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 302. 
 182 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 304–05. 
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adopted the Lopez three-pronged framework,183 even though the Supreme 
Court has never addressed whether it applies to the Foreign Commerce 
Clause context.  The court determined that the Lopez framework was 
nevertheless the best method to apply to this case.184  Because Congress’s 
Foreign Commerce Clause power is greater than its Interstate Commerce 
Clause Power, the court reasoned that if the Act met the Interstate 
Commerce Clause standards it would necessarily satisfy the Foreign 
Commerce Clause standards as well.185 
Although the court noted that other circuit courts had held that “the 
Foreign Commerce Clause requires a jurisdictional nexus ‘with’ the 
United States,” it acknowledged there is scant case law directing courts 
on how to establish this link.186  The court reasoned that the first prong of 
Lopez, whether the subject matter being regulated uses channels of 
interstate commerce, best fit with the facts before it. 187   The court 
explained that Congress enacted section 2423(c) “to regulate persons 
who use the channels of commerce to circumvent local laws that 
criminalize child abuse and molestation,” 188  and that no intent 
requirement is needed for the first prong of Lopez.189  Therefore, the 
Third Circuit concluded that the statute was constitutional in this context 
because the travel between the United States and Germany was the 
“express connection” to channels of foreign commerce.190   Since the 
court found sections 2423(c) and (f)(1) constitutional under the first 
prong of Lopez, the court did not address Pendleton’s argument that his 
actions did not meet the third prong of the Lopez standard, in other 
words, whether his activities substantially affected commerce.191 
																																																																																																																												
 183 Id. at 306 (finding a statute must fit into one of three categories: “[T]o regulate the 
use of channels of interstate commerce”; “to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat 
may come only from intrastate activities”; or “to regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce” (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
558–59 (1995)). 
 184 Id. at 308. 
 185 Id. at 307 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)). 
 186 Id. at 307. 
 187 Id. at 311. 
 188 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 311. 
 189 Id. at 309. 
 190 Id. at 311. 
 191 Id. at 311 n.7. 
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D. The Interstate Commerce Clause Framework Needs to be Revised in 
Order to Correspond with the Foreign Commerce Clause Context 
“[F]orcing foreign commerce cases into the domestic commerce 
rubric is a bit like one of the stepsisters trying to don Cinderella’s glass 
slipper . . . .”192  The Foreign Commerce Clause authority is even more 
powerful than the Interstate Commerce Clause because it can manage 
activities beyond United States borders.193  Currently, the Supreme Court 
has yet to decide if courts should apply the Lopez Interstate Commerce 
standard when assessing congressional authority under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.194  In addition, the Pendleton court recognized that 
the Supreme Court, in early opinions, suggested that lower courts should 
interpret the three parts of the Commerce Clause similarly. 195  
Conversely, the Pendleton court also articulated, “the three subclauses of 
Article I, §8, cl. 3 have acquired markedly different meanings over 
time.” 196   Although the circuit courts have not agreed upon what 
framework to apply to the Foreign Commerce Clause, the circuit courts 
all acknowledge that the Foreign Commerce Clause carries greater power 
because it can reach beyond United States territory.  This extraterritorial 
reach makes the Foreign Commerce Clause fundamentally different than 
the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has recognized the various 
meanings and purposes of the sub-clauses in the Commerce Clause: 
regulating commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and 
with Indian tribes.197  In Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway 
Company,198 the Court stated that laws dealing with “exterior relations” 
between the United States and foreign nations should come exclusively 
from Congress.199  Later, in Japan Line, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
this principle and explained that state laws could potentially “restrict the 
federal government’s ability to ‘speak with one voice’ in foreign 
affairs,”200 and that the “purpose of the Foreign Commerce Clause was to 
																																																																																																																												
 192 United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 193 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 307 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 
448 (1979)). 
 194 Id. at 306. 
 195 Id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824)). 
 196 Id. 
 197 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 306. 
 198 125 U.S. 465 (1888). 
 199 Id. at 482. 
 200 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 307 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 
434, 448 (1979)). 
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establish national uniformity over commerce with foreign nations.”201  
Thus, the Supreme Court explained that the various differences 
suggested “the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce 
power to be greater.”202 
In sum, Congress derives greater power from the Foreign 
Commerce Clause than the Interstate Commerce Clause.  Though a state 
may have a particular interest in its citizens who either commit violations 
of the PROTECT Act abroad or who are victims of conduct prohibited 
by the Act, it cannot properly address this interest through its own 
criminal laws because the Constitution does not extend this power to the 
states individually.  Rather, the Constitution reserves this power for the 
federal government.  Foreign affairs are an interest of the United States 
as a whole.  The Foreign Commerce Clause embodies the idea that the 
United States must have one cohesive position and not fifty individual 
state positions when dealing with foreign governments.  Ultimately, the 
Foreign Commerce Clause is the most appropriate vehicle for curtailing 
child-sex tourism, because the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
Foreign Commerce Clause gives Congress authority that applies more 
directly to the interests implicated by foreign affairs. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROTECT ACT SHOULD BE 
EVALUATED UNDER AN ECONOMIC EFFECTS THEORY OF THE FOREIGN 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. The Foreign Commerce Clause is the Appropriate Source of 
Congressional Authority to Regulate Criminal Exploitation of Children 
Abroad. 
The Foreign Commerce Clause provides a clearer source of the 
United States’ power to criminalize child sex tourism abroad than the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.  Under a Foreign Commerce Clause 
analysis, the conduct or regulation in question must involve commerce 
																																																																																																																												
 201 Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448 (citing Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 
U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (“In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and 
trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and 
adequate national power.”)). 
 202 Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, pp. 279–83 
(James Madison); 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
478 (1911) (Madison); Albert S. Able, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional 
Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 465–75 (1941) 
(concluding that “there is no tenable reason for believing that anywhere nearly so large a 
range of action was given over commerce ‘among the several states’ as over that ‘with 
foreign nations’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3))). 
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between the United States and a foreign nation.203  The PROTECT Act 
satisfies this analysis, because commercial child sex tourism presents an 
economic nexus between a foreign nation and the United States.  Sex 
tourism’s revenue in nations like Cambodia demonstrates its fiscal 
character and thus implicates the PROTECT Act’s commercial prong, 
section 2423(f)(2).  Even non-commercial child sex tourism provides an 
economic nexus between a foreign nation and the United States under an 
economic effects theory.204 
The PROTECT Act’s non-commercial prong, section 2423(f)(1), is 
constitutional because Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority is 
far-reaching; it can transcend the traditional view of commerce as strictly 
regulating commercial goods by reaching non-commercial activities that 
travel through interstate and foreign commerce.205  These non-economic 
activities include “racial discrimination or growing wheat for personal 
consumption,” or any other activities which “affect, impede, or utilize 
the channels of commerce.”206  As the Supreme Court stated in Lopez, 
Congress can enact a statute that surpasses the regulation of commercial 
goods and regulates non-commercial activities,207 as long as a statute 
falls within one of the delineated categories under Congress’s commerce 
power.208  Thus, Congress has authority to regulate the non-commercial 
sexual exploitation of children abroad because it has economic 
consequences. 
1. The Economic Nexus Between the United States and a Foreign 
Nation When U.S. Actors Engage in Non-Commercial Sex Abuse 
Abroad and the Economic Effects it has on the U.S. 
Child sex abuse under sections 2423(c) and (f)(1) economically 
affects the foreign nation and the United States alike.  For instance, 
offenders who are also United States citizens can spend their money in a 
foreign nation to engage in child sex abuse instead of consuming other 
services within the United States’ borders.  Put another way, theses 
citizen-offenders take money out of the U.S. economy and, instead, use it 
in foreign economies to sexually exploit children.209 
																																																																																																																												
 203 United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 204 See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 205 Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1048 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942)). 
 206 Id. at 1048 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)). 
 207 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995). 
 208 Id. at 558. 
 209 Cf. Michael A. Zuckerman, The Offshoring of American Government, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 165, 167–68 (2008) (stating that state and local government outsourcing, the 
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Purchasing airline tickets to go abroad is an example of travel that 
impacts the economy of the nations where the offenders purchased their 
tickets.  If the United States citizen-offender bought a plane ticket from a 
company located in the United States, the U.S. company essentially 
profits from the offender’s decision to sexually exploit children while 
abroad.  The exact moment that the intent is formulated to sexually abuse 
children is irrelevant.210  There is nevertheless an economic exchange 
that facilitates the offense: American airline companies profit financially 
regardless of whether offenders have the intent to have sex with minors 
abroad upon purchasing their tickets or they only decide to sexually 
abuse children after their arrival.  The same is true for United States 
citizen-offenders who purchase their tickets from airline companies 
based in foreign nations; there is still be an economic impact because the 
offenders are participating in child sex tourism with United States 
revenue.  Therefore, this type of economic activity ties non-commercial 
sex abuse to the Foreign Commerce Clause. 
B. Adopting a Foreign Commerce Clause Standard 
The Supreme Court does not have to develop a novel framework in 
order to create a cohesive and uniform test for determining the 
constitutionality of the PROTECT Act and legislation like it under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause.  Although no court has adapted the three-
prong Lopez test in finding Foreign Commerce Clause authority for the 
PROTECT Act, courts addressing other statutes have suggested that it 
might be feasible to adapt and apply it to all statutes enacted under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause.211  Since the courts apply the Lopez standard 
“among the several States,”212  in order to create a workable Foreign 
Commerce Clause standard, the foreign standard needs to reflect a nexus 
with foreign commerce in order to qualify as the regulation of 
“commerce with foreign Nations.” 213   This nexus requirement grants 
Congress the authority to regulate commerce when it is related to the 
United States. 
																																																																																																																												
process of contracting a foreign party to provide goods or services, has taken “nearly $ 12 
billion and is expected to grow to $ 20 billion by 2011” out of the United States, bringing 
it offshore.)  “The flow of value between states and state contractors or subcontractors 
engaged in offshore operations constitutes foreign commerce.”  Id. at 185. 
 210 See 148 CONG. REC. 3884, 3885 (daily ed. June 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. 
Flake). 
 211 Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1049 n.1. 
 212 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 213 Colangelo, supra note 49, at 970. 
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In analyzing the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act, which 
regulates child sex tourism, under the Foreign Commerce Clause, courts 
should adopt the approach the Ninth Circuit alluded to in United States v. 
Cummings.214  Under this approach, courts would apply the Lopez test to 
the requirement that Congress’s regulation affects foreign commerce.215  
In Cummings, the court found the International Parental Kidnapping 
Crime Act (IPKCA) constitutional.216  IPKCA allows for the prosecution 
of any parents who (1) do not have sole custody of their children, and (2) 
travel to a foreign country to withhold their children from another parent 
in violation of the other parent’s parental rights.217  The Ninth Circuit 
used the “regulating the channels of commerce” test from Lopez but 
applied it to situations where something or someone travels from the 
United States to a foreign nation, thereby incorporating a nexus to 
foreign commerce.218  Several scholars have agreed that it is logical to 
use the Lopez framework paired with a nexus requirement in a Foreign 
Commerce Clause analysis because, without a nexus requirement, the 
Foreign Commerce Clause is not implicated.219 
The test that courts should apply when analyzing the 
constitutionality of statutes under the Foreign Commerce Clause should 
reflect this approach from Cummings, which essentially combines the 
Lopez analytical framework in the foreign commerce context with the 
Weingarten nexus requirement.220  Modeled upon Lopez, the three-part 
inquiry under the Foreign Commerce Clause should be as follows: 
Congress has authority to enact legislation under its Foreign Commerce 
Clause power in order to (1) regulate the use of the channels of foreign 
commerce when there is a nexus connecting the United States; (2) 
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of foreign commerce when 
there is a nexus to the United States, even though the threat may come 
only from activities within the foreign nation; and (3) regulate activities 
that have a substantial relation to foreign commerce and a nexus 
connecting the United States.221  This framework provides a coherent 
justification for any statute purportedly authorized under Congress’s 
																																																																																																																												
 214 281 F.3d at 1048–49. 
 215 Id. at 1049 n.1. 
 216 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a). 
 217 Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1048. 
 218 See id. at 1049. 
 219 See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 49, at 971. 
 220 United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 221 I rely primarily on the categories hypothesized by Colangeo, but also integrate the 
Supreme Court’s discussion from Cummings.  See Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1049 n.1; 
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Foreign Commerce Clause powers, instead of a direct reliance upon the 
Lopez framework as a means of analyzing Congress’s authority to 
regulate and punish the conduct of its citizens abroad.222 
C. Congress May Criminalize the Sexual Abuse of Minors Abroad Where 
it has a Substantial Economic Effect and Nexus to the United States 
Although the Third Circuit in United States v. Pendleton found that 
Congress’s criminalization of non-commercial child sexual abuse abroad 
was a valid exercise of constitutional authority, even where the 
perpetrator did not possess a criminal intent prior to traveling abroad, the 
way in which the court reached its conclusion was misguided.  The Third 
Circuit used the first prong of the Lopez Interstate Commerce Clause test, 
which regulates the use of the channels of interstate commerce, even 
after recognizing that the Foreign Commerce Clause could be 
implemented similar to the Interstate Commerce Clause with a nexus 
requirement—like in Cummings—but chose not to use this approach.223  
Instead, the Third Circuit should have analyzed sections 2423(c) and 
(f)(1) of the PROTECT Act by determining if the activities have a 
substantial relation to foreign commerce and a nexus to the United 
States.224 
In order to determine whether an offender’s action in a foreign 
nation substantially affects the United States, the court should have 
considered the United States’ ratification of the Optional Protocol.225  
When the United States violates a treaty, like the Optional Protocol, there 
is inevitably a substantial effect on the United States because America 
has become a party to the Optional Protocol, a joint effort to ensure that 
children are not exploited.  Thus, if one travels in foreign commerce and 
engages in illicit sexual conduct as defined in section 2423(c), then a 
																																																																																																																												
 222 Scholars have also argued that the PROTECT Act overreaches into the sovereignty 
of a nation, violating principles of international law and thus represents an overextension 
of Congress’s authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause.  See Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 
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in agreement with the Optional Protocol and are one of the hundred that have signed on 
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when they are abroad.  See Optional Protocol, supra note 75. 
 223 Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 307–08; cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 224 See generally Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1049 n.1; Weingarten, 632 F.3d at 61. 
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connection of substantial effect on the United States is established 
because the United States is a party to the Optional Protocol and is 
responsible for implementing it. 
Furthermore, scholars and the Supreme Court alike seem to agree 
that the Foreign Commerce Clause analysis should focus on whether the 
conduct being regulated has a substantial effect on foreign commerce and 
a nexus to the United States.  For example, the Supreme Court in 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California suggested that the 
“substantial effect” prong is the appropriate standard to assess statutes 
under the Foreign Commerce Clause and stated: “Congress has broad 
power under Article I §8, cl. 3 ‘to regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations,’ and this Court has repeatedly upheld its power to make laws 
applicable to persons or activities beyond our territorial boundaries 
where United States interests are affected.”226  Although the Supreme 
Court decided Hartford Fire prior to Lopez, the earlier decision might 
have served as a precursor to the focus in Lopez’s third-prong on the 
“substantial effect” on foreign commerce. 
In analyzing the Clark227 decision, legal scholar Anthony Colangelo 
suggested that even though there are limitations, commercial sexual 
activity abroad does in fact substantially affect the United States by 
virtue of the offender’s U.S. citizenship.228  Colangelo described how the 
court in Clark rationalized a substantial effect analysis “so long as the 
effect of Clark’s conduct on foreign commerce with the United States 
would authorize extraterritorial jurisdiction under current international 
law, that effect should be constitutionally sufficient to permit regulation 
under the Clause.” 229   Prior to the Pendleton decision, however, 
Colangelo also argued that Congress’s criminalization of non-
commercial sexual abuse of children abroad does not constitute the 
regulation of economic activity. 230   Colangelo was skeptical that 
“Congress could regulate noneconomic activity abroad under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.”231  Although this argument has merit in light of the 
Supreme Court’s statement in United States v. Morrison,232 that gender 
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motivated crimes were not economic,233 the Court made that statement in 
the context of analyzing whether Congress had authority to caste a wide 
net and encompass a “purely intrastate, body of violent crime”234 under 
the Interstate Commerce Clause.  That reasoning does not apply when 
Congress seeks to punish individuals, who, after traveling abroad (not 
intrastate), place United States money into a foreign economy in order to 
have the means and privacy to sexually abuse a child. 
Morrison did not involve the Optional Protocol and did not address 
a matter dealing so directly with foreign nations such as the application 
of a multilateral treaty.235  In contrast, the PROTECT Act, which was 
based upon the Optional Protocol, a treaty governing how the United 
States and other nations treat child sex abuse crimes, substantially affects 
commerce between nations.  In these circumstances, courts are 
evaluating how foreign commerce affects other nations.  Thus, although 
gender-motivated crimes may have been deemed non-economic crimes 
when occurring within the United States that does not preclude a 
determination that child sexual abuse in the realm of foreign commerce 
cannot constitute an economic crime.  As courts have determined, the 
Optional Protocol 236  provides Congress with even more powerful 
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause because it can manage 
activities beyond U.S. borders.237 
Congress’s criminalization of U.S. citizens’ non-commercial sexual 
abuse of minors while abroad, where the perpetrator lacks a prior intent 
to commit the act before traveling abroad, passes constitutional muster 
based upon Congress’s authority in the Foreign Commerce Clause power 
to regulate activities that have a substantial relation to foreign commerce 
and a nexus connecting the United States.238  First, the United States has 
the authority to regulate this non-commercial activity in relation to the 
substantial effects connecting the U.S. and the foreign nation.  For 
example, in Pendleton, how the defendant abused the victim in Germany 
illustrates “substantial” economic effects.  Specifically, Pendleton, while 
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in Germany, developed a friendship and rapport with his victim, a 
fourteen-year-old boy who lived in an orphanage. 239   After several 
months of getting to know the victim, Pendleton arranged to bring him 
on an overnight bike trip in Germany.240  While on the biking trip, the 
young boy woke up in the campsite they were staying to Pendleton 
“fondling him.”241  The fact that Pendleton used money from the United 
States to purchase the bike trip and campsite lodging in Germany, which 
allowed him to victimize the young boy, demonstrates an economic 
effect on foreign commerce.  Pendleton did not exchange money with the 
boy for the sexual act; however, by virtue of a U.S. citizen being abroad, 
a similar exchange of resources is always at issue when sexual abuse of 
minors occurs abroad. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Child sex tourism is an industry where offenders exploit children 
globally.  The men and women who sexually abuse children feed the 
industry.  The United States government has attempted to address this 
issue by implementing the PROTECT Act.  Since its enactment, circuit 
courts have gone to great lengths to find the PROTECT Act 
constitutional, leading to a variety of different approaches among the 
courts.  Congress had authority to enact the PROTECT Act based on the 
Foreign Commerce Clause, not the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the 
Supreme Court’s framework in Lopez for evaluating questions arising 
under the Interstate Commerce Clause does not logically apply to a 
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis.  An appropriate analysis under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause might be similar to the Lopez framework but 
should include a nexus requirement between the United States and the 
foreign nation in order to reflect the greater authority to manage 
activities beyond United States borders so long as there is an economic 
connection.  Under this proposed framework, Congress has authority to 
criminalize child sex abuse that takes place abroad even if the offender 
does not have prior intent at the time of travel.  A substantial economic 
nexus is present when the illicit child sexual abuse is occurring in 
another country and the United States citizen is the abuser.  Ultimately, 
Congress may regulate activities that are substantially related to foreign 
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commerce with the United States, and this is satisfied by an economic 
effects theory of non-commercial activity. 
